

The Role of The Leadership of Nursultan Nazarbayev in Kazakhstan's Stability

Serdar YILMAZ*

Abstract

Kazakhstan is a country as large as Western Europe with a great economic potential thanks to its vast mineral resources in Central Asia region. Since its independence following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Kazakhstan has achieved a rapid economic growth as well as stable political environment. It has been monitored by other countries for its economic modernization and attempt to be open to foreign countries in order to attract foreign capital investments in its construction, telecommunication, infrastructure and energy sectors. However, this study will not provide an introduction of the country, instead, it will try to analyse why Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev is regarded as the symbol of political stability in Kazakhstan by referring the charismatic-revolutionary type of leadership generated by a prominent foreign policy formulator Henry A. Kissinger. Kissinger argues that a strong and experienced leadership is necessary to solve different kinds of problems and that is why the nature of leadership gives direction to the course of a country. As he states, especially new countries have a high incentive to seek for charismatic-revolutionary leadership in their domestic and foreign relations. Thus, this study will strive to demonstrate that Nazarbayev's leadership resembles the charismatic-revolutionary type as Kazakhstan is a very young and independent country. The study also examines what kind of role the leadership of Nazarbayev plays on the stability in the country.

Key Words: Kazakhstan, Political Stability, Leadership, Nursultan Nazarbayev

Introduction

Kazakhstan is the 9th largest country on earth but was hidden amongs the other Central Asian states as known the "stans" until the independence from the Soviet Union in 16 December 1991. The country has emerged as a strong, developing and modern state with far-reaching strategies after 25 years later. With vast reserves of gas, oil and mineral resources, growing economic importance, future strategy, development

*Assistant Professor Dr., Department of International Relations, Istanbul Arel University, Istanbul-Turkey, Email; serdaryilmaz@arel.edu.tr, 00905413457582 Istanbul Arel University, Tepekent Kampüsü, Büyükçekmece, İstanbul-Türkiye.

perspective and political and economic stability it is the richest country in Central Asia. The country is dealing with developing a bonded national identity as well as expanding and exporting her rich energy resources towards world markets while domestically implementing political, social and a multiparty parliament system. Kazakhstan was caught by surprise by the collapse of the Soviet Union and had been unable for a long period to reorient her policies. However, the country gradually transformed over the years from a net recipient of foreign direct investment into an international foreign investor thanks to its prudent and strategic economic policies and oil wealth.

This article sets out to use the charismatic-revolutionary leadership as a conceptual tool to examine why Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev is regarded as the symbol of political stability in post-Soviet Kazakhstan. Thus, the aim of the study is to examine the discourse of the charismatic-revolutionary leadership and its practicality in Kazakhstan. Using a number of features of the charismatic-revolutionary leadership model based on the typology developed by Kissinger, the study accepts that while Nazarbayev meets some of the traits of Kissinger's below mentioned leadership types, he is quite close meeting the attributes of the charismatic-revolutionary leadership model. The study also focuses on the reasons of the early presidential elections on April 26, 2015 and the role of Nazarbayev's leadership on the stability of the country. The hypothesis of the study is that Nazarbayev's reelection in 2015 indicates his absolute centrality to political stability in Kazakhstan and his personalised leadership actually encourages him to play a potent role in foreign as well as domestic policy of the country.

Nazarbayev's leadership is distinct from other post-Soviet Central Asian leaders, where he seems to be taken more seriously by the outside world as a leader who has been successful in meeting any number of qualities of the charismatic-revolutionary leadership model in which leaders create values, make sacrifices, define goals, accept state's survival as the top priority, care experience more than ideology and meet the demands of nation-building (Kissinger, 1966: 522-524). The discourse of Nazarbayev's charismatic-revolutionary leadership is embraced not only by a number of loyal elite officials and his political party Nur Otan (Light of Fatherland) but also is adopted by many civil society institutions, other parties and most importantly by Kazakh citizens. Nazarbayev has been a practitioner of the Kazakh model in which he has successfully made the transition from a socialist economy to a free market economy model, adapted quickly to the world community and adopted the motto "economy comes first" to take the realities of post-Soviet Kazakhstan into account (Yilmaz, 2014: 28-40).

As Rico Isaacs (2010: 436) argues that the adoption of presidential systems in the post-Soviet area caused personalised power and strong presidential figures (leaders) that have the power to shape the destiny of their nations. These leaders have often been classified as charismatic, revolutionary in a way and fathers of nations. In this case, Nazarbayev is an appropriate case to analyse as the Kazakh Constitution, section 3-article 40, has been labelled him as the father of Kazakhs (Atakazak) since 1995 (Constitution of Kazakhstan, 2011: 8). Nursultan Nazarbayev has been in power since 1991 and has his hand in the development of every part of the country. Thus, this article argues that charismatic-revolutionary leadership model represents a coherent argument that emphasises Nazarbayev's centrality to the unity and stability of Kazakhstan.

The article first mentions of a brief theoretical discussion on Kissinger's charismatic-revolutionary leadership model. It then analyses Nursultan Nazarbayev's personality in accordance with his life story and presidential system which personalised the political power around Nazarbayev since the independence of the

country. The third section sets out the reasons of the early presidential elections on April 26, 2015 and the role of Nazarbayev's leadership on the stability of country by providing examples confirming the hypothesis of the study and assessing the discourse of charismatic leadership from above and below. Second and third sections provide some support to the relevance of Kissinger's charismatic-revolutionary leadership model for Nursultan Nazarbayev by referring to the works of some scholars like Feld (1979), Geldenhuys (1984), Cleava (1989), Maoz (1990), and Roberts (2016). The study ends with a conclusion considering why Nazarbayev is seen as the symbol of political stability and what role his leadership plays on the stability in Kazakhstan.

The Charismatic-Revolutionary Leadership Model

In the traditional conception, domestic and international affairs are conducted by the political units and domestic structure of a country usually determines the course of its international relations. Deon Geldenhuys (1984: 239) discusses that Kissinger's leadership models are formed by leaders' experiences during their crown, the domestic structure in which they deal with and the values of their society. Similarly, Zeev Maoz (1990: 52-53) asserts that Kissinger's classification of leadership types base upon the premise that societal and political structures determine the relationship between leaders' personality and their foreign policy. Thus, different political systems produce different types of leaders and policy orientations. According to Kissinger, if domestic structure is stable, it is highly unlikely for a country to embark on an adventure in foreign policy. He argues that "when the domestic structures are based on different conceptions of what is just, the conduct of international affairs grows more complex. Then it becomes difficult to define the nature of disagreement because what seems most obvious to one side appears most problematic to the other" (Kissinger, 1966: 503). In any case, a strong and experienced leadership is necessary to solve different kinds of problems and that is why the nature of leadership gives direction to the course of a country.

Kissinger identified three general types of leadership: the bureaucratic-pragmatic, the ideological and the charismatic-revolutionary leadership. As Kissinger puts forward that bureaucratic-pragmatic leadership is shaped by a society without fundamental social schisms (fragmentation). Due to leaders are solution-oriented, pragmatic and interested in only what they have, this leadership type is regarded as a mechanical leadership. Leaders' approach is ad hoc and pragmatic. The method used to solve the problem has priority over the judgement and conviction of the leader. Leaders are interested in realities rather than assumptions. In this leadership type domestic policy has a higher priority than foreign policy (Kissinger, 1966: 514-515). This leadership type is mainly found in American elites and developed Western societies. Gregory Cleava (1989: 110-111) has spotted the shortcomings of this leadership type as the loss of creativity, the reactive nature of policy and the emphasis on problem-solving. In this model, formulation of foreign policy is considered as a serious of political bargains and represents a compromise among the different interest of policy makers. This leadership is regarded as the act of forming a coalition and consensus among comparatively equal groups.

As for the ideological type of leadership, this is usually seen in communist parties and communist countries, particularly Soviet Union. As this type of leaders accept security-oriented policies they prefer defensive foreign relations. Leaders are skeptical of what is happening in the domestic structure and especially approach the outside world with precaution. There is no legitimate change in leadership and thus leaders spend their energy mostly on domestic issues. Leader's ideology is the ideology of the state. Leaders achieve through the promotion of certain ideals, goals and values and they do not invest time in activities that are contrary to those abstract principles (Kissinger, 1966: 518-520). As Geldenhuys (1984: 239) puts through

that social structure, economic process and class struggle are contemplated in Kissinger's this type of leadership more significant than statesmen's personal convictions. Maoz (1990: 53) interprets Kissinger's ideological leadership as a product of societies that are shaped by ideological dogma (a belief or doctrine accepted without being questioned). He continues to elucidate that leaders' conception of the world, interpretation of events and behavioral orientation are shaped by this dogma.

The last leadership type Kissinger mentions is the charismatic-revolutionary type. He argues that contemporary international order is heavily influenced by this leadership model which is associated with leaders of the new nations. Leaders are more interested in the future which they wish to construct as they have a future vision. Revolutionaries are rarely motivated by material considerations as they believe in making bigger sacrifices. As in Kissinger's words, "to revolutionaries the significant reality is the world which they are striving to bring about, not the world they are fighting to overcome." The state's survival is the top priority as they see the state as the representative of the primary, basis and manifestation of social cohesion. If, for instance, economic situation or foreign policy disrupts the traditional, social and political structure, leaders tend to reestablish the legitimacy of their rule and take revolutionary decisions to use foreign policy as a means to maintain domestic cohesion. Experience of leaders is more important than their ideology, especially for new states to go through nation building process (Kissinger, 1966: 522-524). Wermer Feld (1979: 117) supports the conceptual framework of the charismatic-revolutionary leadership by emphasizing that this leadership model is mainly found in the new nations of Africa and Asia as their political systems follow hierarchical, autocratic and post-socialist principles. This important part of the leadership model also prepares a legitimate platform for investigating this subject.

Geldenhuis (1984: 239) argues that it is leaders' personal experiences in the struggle for independence that have provided the impetus for these leaders. Maoz (1990: 53) considers this leadership model as a product of rapidly changing societies in which there is a lack of institutionalized bureaucratic institutions. It is difficult to predict the behavioral patterns of the charismatic-revolutionary leaders, however, these kind of leaders are most likely to take risks and pioneer substantial foreign policy shifts. Cleva (1989: 110) provides some support for this leadership by claiming that due to activism, philosophical orientation and political sensitivity of charismatic-revolutionary leaders, this model provides a more powerful model of leadership than the other two models.

The situation seems complicated as three types of leadership have something in common for Nazarbayev. Nonetheless, charismatic-revolutionary model is useful to express two distinguished features of Nazarbayev's leadership. He precisely has charisma, especially for Turkish (Turkic) world. His charisma retains remarkable abilities such as determination, intelligence, patience, trustworthiness, persuasiveness, perception and cognitive skills. However, as Kissinger states, especially new countries have a high incentive to seek for charismatic-revolutionary leadership in their domestic and foreign relations, this study will strive to demonstrate that Nazarbayev's leadership resembles the charismatic-revolutionary type as Kazakhstan is a very young and independent country.

Nazarbaev and Presidential System

As Roberts argues (2016: 72-74) that Central Asia countries (former Soviet states) are one place in the world where politics is almost all about leadership. In the case of the region's five states Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Kyrgyzstan, political leadership has managed to prevent state failure, long conflicts or economic collapse. However, Kazakhstan has a different place among these countries as she has

a high level of economic liberalism; providing citizens with financial opportunities, encouraging people to have quality education and developing critical thinking skills. Thus, other Central Asian countries look to Kazakhstan's economy and development speed as an example of what a post-Soviet country can accomplish. This is not only related to Kazakhstan's rich energy sources but also its political leadership namely Nursultan Nazarbayev.

Nursultan Abishevich Nazarbayev was born on July 6, 1940 in Chemolgan in Almaty region. After graduating from Highest Technical Educational Institution in Karaganda, he started working at the Karaganda Metallurgic Works as a steelworker. As in Nazarbayev's words, "it was not really about a steel, it was about the human spirit. Its message was that by belief, commitment and eagerness to serve" (Aitken, 2009: 17). In the meantime, he was involved in the communist party and served as the secretary of the party committee of his workplace from 1973 to 1977. Nazarbayev, who was climbing the steps one after another, served as the secretary of central committee of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan between 1979 and 1984. He was the chairman of the Ministers Council of the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic between 1984 and 1989 (AKORDA, 2016). Nazarbayev, as the first president of the nation, modern constructor of national identity and the architect of Kazakh domestic and foreign policy has been serving as the President of Kazakhstan since 1990 (Olcott, 1995: 259).

In order to better understand the political position and the popularity of Nazarbayev, it is required to explain Nazarbayev's reelection in 2015. Nazarbayev's reelection chances and his popularity raised some questions as to if this person was so popular among the population and had no real political rival, why on earth he would need to have snap election. There are several factors that explain this situation. First, the president is genuinely popular, winning credit for the political stability and rising standard of living for his oil-rich nation in the country. According to Aitken (2012: 6), Kazakhs look on Nazarbayev as the founding father of nation and believe that the country would not have survived without his vigilant leadership during the hard times. Second, according to Sholk (2015),

"Kazakhstan's national ideology and apparent obsession with global crises is a consequence of history and geography which Nazarbayev combined wisely. Third, one consequence of the historical development of the nomadic peoples of Inner Eurasia is that Kazakhstan's contemporary political culture is characterized by conservatism and a preference for a strongman leader whose primary responsibility is to safeguard national security."

Lastly as Rajabova (2015) points out that Nursultan Nazarbayev proved himself a resourceful ruler and he has long been associated as a symbol of stability in Kazakhstan. Under these circumstances, since many countries around the world have experienced serious political instability, changing of leadership is considered as undesirable and even dangerous by Kazakh citizens (AZERNEWS, 2015).

Briefly, as Olcott (1997: 549) states that

"Kazakhstan has managed to survive enormous political and economic upheavals in relative peace. This continued stability is largely due to the popularity of Nursultan Nazarbayev, who satisfies Kazakh national pride because he is a Kazakh, but who also reassures Russians, because he was a prominent Soviet."

Having a vision for future and relying on experience rather than ideology are the features of the charismatic-revolutionary type of leadership. In other words, in December 2012, Nazarbayev launched a new 'Kazakhstan 2050 Strategy' that focuses on the economic and social developments, stable growth, the development of a middle class, the role of innovation and new technologies. He also made an effort to rank Kazakhstan among the top 30 most developed countries in the world by 2050 (Strategy2050, 2014). President Nazarbayev also launched a new programme of 'five institutional reforms' to announce "100 Concrete Steps" which intended to break Kazakhstan's Soviet institutional legacy and to ensure Kazakhstan as a modern and market-based economy (THEASTANATIMES, 2015).

Nursultan Nazarbayev was appointed as the president on 24 April 1990 and became the first elected president next year, won the presidential elections in 1995, 1999, 2005, 2011 and 2015 respectively. He has been serving at this position for 26 years with no interruption. Nazarbayev was declared as the "President of the State" in the constitution accepted on 28 December 1993 and a strong presidential system with extensive constitutional power is legitimized in the country by the 1995 constitution. He is permitted to appoint the judges, prosecutors and the president of the constitutional court by the 1993 constitution, and became the only person responsible for the entire execution in the country after the acceptance of the 1995 constitution (AKORDA, 2016). The president can appoint the members of the government, appoint and dismiss the prime minister, abolish the parliament, hold an emergency meeting, decide to hold elections, sustain the unity of the state and continuation of legislation, execution and jurisdiction powers and finally sign and execute the international agreements for the country (TURKPA, 2012: 59-98).

Kazakhstan's state structure has a strong president with extensive constitutional authority that puts him at the top of the all state systems. The prime minister is rather responsible for economic and technical works. The president makes decisions about the regular and early elections, calls for the opening of the parliament and accepts the oaths of the members of the parliament. He signs agreements, vetoes laws or sends them back to the parliament for some articles to be discussed and voted again. He decides who will be the prime minister and accepts their resignation, after the appointment of the prime minister, he decides the structure and the members of the government or refuse. He has duties of creating, refusing and recreating executive bodies that do not belong to the structure of the government. In emergency cases, he presides the government sessions and asks them to make legislative proposals to the parliament. He also appoints the members of the government and governors. He appoints or dismisses the head of central bank with the agreement of the parliament, general prosecutor and the head of national security committee with the agreement of the senate (Amangaliyeva, 2012: 34-35). He ratifies the national programs of the country, the decision of holding a referendum and abolishes the parliament (İsayev, 2003: 2).

Reelection and the Role of Nazarbayev on Stability

President Nursultan Nazarbayev who has built the country's success around his authority is at the very heart of Kazakhstan's stability. Even though his age makes succession a topical issue for internal players in the country, the presidential election foreseen to be held normally in 2016 was held on Sunday, 26th of April 2015 with the proposal of the Kazakhstan Nations Assembly and the approval of the Kazakh Parliament and Nazarbayev himself. Whilst Organisation for Security and Co-operation (OSCE) observers found that early presidential election 2015 fell short of OSCE standards, Nursultan Nazarbayev remains genuinely popular (OSCE, 2015: 21-25).

What was the reason to reschedule the election to be held a year earlier? Kazakhstan has 2% of the total petroleum reserves of the world and 60% of the payment balance in the country is made with the income from petroleum export. In the February 2015, 18-20% devaluation of the Kazakhstani currency Tenge, the annexation of Crimea by Russia and the continuing regional turbulence caused by the Ukrainian crisis followed immediately after, the serious devaluation of Russian Ruble and the downfall of the petroleum prices were all the important reasons of the rescheduling the elections for an earlier date. As Abdurasulov (2015) argues that Kazakhstan has been dealing with the negative impact of the world economic crisis and her efforts about creating economic integration with Russia have not helped either. Located in a region between the Russian grizzly bear and the Chinese dragon (The Economist used this term in 2006), being focal point of the conflict of interest of the United State of America (USA), Kazakhstan should both sustain a stable foreign and domestic policy to keep her borders safe and stay independent politically and economically. Thus, as Yılmaz (2015) argues, in order to strengthen the unity, harmony and stability, to refresh trust before a potential economic slowdown and to keep economy strong against the risks, the election was decided to be rescheduled for an earlier date.

Nazarbayev won all the presidential elections he participated in as well as the last election on 26 April 2015 with 97,5% of the votes of around 9,5 million participants (OSCE, 2015: 21-22). Kazakh people trust, care and respect their president to the extreme. Nazarbayev is the name of the stability and this is mostly related with the characteristic qualities of Nazarbayev and the developments he made in the country (Arianfar, 2016). Nazarbayev has been very determined about the reforms to be done in the economic fields, but he was not hasty in the democratic reforms and he explained this situation at the celebrations of the 10th anniversary of the independence as such:

“During the independence period, we were seeing democracy not as a tool to be learned how to use but as an icon to be worshipped. The foreign countries were admired overlooking our own characteristics, but every country should follow democracy route while considering their own characteristics” (Togayev, 2004: 47-48).

According to Kissinger (1966: 522-524), leaders' experience is more important than their ideology, especially for new states to go through nation building process. As Rico Isaacs (2010: 443-448) puts forward that Nazarbayev is a successful, justifiable, pragmatic and understandable leader who is finding solutions for the problems the country encounters during the nation building and nationalization processes, avoiding ethnic conflicts, providing economic prosperity and recognition in the international arena and strengthening the national unity. He is always tolerant, never ridicules different ethnicities and members of other religions and never discriminates religious sects. During the presidency of Nazarbayev, there has been a continuous economic stability and growth, an increase in the prosperity of a certain group with the increase of the life standards, and the country has become an attraction point for foreign investments and investment laws are enforced accordingly. A middle class is created in Kazakhstan with the rise in petroleum profits (Isaacs, 2010: 448-452). Additionally, Nazarbayev has been particularly good at promoting the idea that his leadership is paramount to stability in his country. During his campaign for 2015's presidential election he simply noted that he was quite confident that Kazakh people would vote for their stability because they have been supportive of his policies and leadership (Roberts, 2016: 72).

One of the other examples of Nazarbayev's leadership, which suits Kissinger's (1966: 522-524) charismatic-revolutionary type is that Nazarbayev considers the state's survival as the top priority as these type of leaders

see the state represents the primary, basis and manifestation of social cohesion. What Nazarbayev did to suit this leadership is that he demonstrated a strong political will for the state's survival to move the capital city to the north of the country. As Richard Wolfell (2010: 487-495) underlines, Nazarbayev knew that being prevalent in the decision to relocate a capital city was a historical imperative and historical motivation, therefore, the movement of the capital was often initiated because of the strong will of Nazarbayev. He was aware of the divided demography of the country where the Russian speakers settled in the north and the ethnic Kazakhs in the South. This situation provided him with an opportunity to take a revolutionary decision to shift a large proportion of the Kazakh population into the northern regions of the country. In his book called "In the Hearth of Eurasia", Nazarbayev explains how he encountered opposition and difficulties when he decided to move the capital from Almaty to Astana. However, he was decisive that Astana would become a signature of not only Kazakhstan but also Central Asia and thus he had to deal with opposing views (Nazarbayev, 2012: 25-48).

The political system formed after Kazakhstan gained her independence defines the domestic and foreign policies of the country and Nazarbayev plays the primary role to determine this policy. Nazarbayev directs the statesmen who govern the country around a round table like an orchestra conductor, refining different thoughts in his own mind, following the global developments closely, feeling close to the regional integrations and good neighboring policies, determined and patient to bring Kazakhstan to the level it deserves (Yılmaz, 2016: 18-19). Nazarbayev, unlike some post-Soviet leaders, has established a multi group of foreign investors and avoided becoming dependant on any economic power like Russia, China and the US. According to Roberts (2016: 74), some of Nazarbayev's policies like cultivating technocrats to establish international financial standards, creating "merit-based" middle class of entrepreneurs, building strong state institutions with professional civil servants, founding state-sponsored educational institutions and allowing skilled foreign specialists to work for the development of Kazakhstan together with abovementioned findings have proven how Nazarbayev is a skilled leader and demonstrated why Nazarbayev is seen as a symbol of political stability in Kazakhstan.

The notion behind Nazarbayev's charismatic-revolutionary leadership is also tied to the perception that Nazarbayev has so far been successful in maintaining the country's national identity, resisting the difficulties on nation-building, providing economic welfare, avoiding ethnic conflict albeit there are many living together and securing international legitimacy (Isaacs, 2010: 438). As noted by Aitken (2009: 118) that the most difficult problem in front of Nazarbayev at the beginning of Kazakhstan's independence was to promote Kazakh identity and to strengthen the ethnic integrity while ensuring other ethnic groups not to marginalise. Nazarbayev's "Kazakhstan Strategy 2030 and Strategy 2050" programs have thus been comprehensive to draw a clear route for harmony and peace of different social, ethnic and religious groups. Nazarbayev (Strategy 2050, 2014: 6-7) states that,

"Naturally, it is out of the question that some ethnic or religious groups be granted any priorities against the other ones. Our strategic objective is a unity of multiform groups of the population, reasonable combination of personal and social fundamentals which add substantially to consensus and hierarchic traditions of our society... Just as equally there is no future for the country in which various ethnic and religious groups exercise different rights, in which some groups are granted all sorts of benefits and opportunities whereas the others are denied same."

This statement has demonstrated the importance of Nazarbayev's nation-building policy. However, as Edward Schatz (2000: 494-498) argues that while strengthening the ethnic integrity and harmony on the one hand, Nazarbayev introduced the process of "Kazakhification" to increase the number of Kazakhs and to

consolidate ties with non-Kazakh population on the other hand. According to Isaacs (2010: 439) “this careful steering between ensuring stability through a promotion of multi-ethnic diversity and tolerance, while simultaneously promoting the idea and concepts of Kazakh identity and nationhood,” has appeared in Kazakhstan as one of the great successes of Nazarbayev’s leadership.

Conclusion

Consequently, even though the opposition did not predict how much the election in 2015 could accelerate the democratization process in Kazakhstan, they developed no alternative projects and strategies about the issues they want to be changed. The ruling party and the supporters of Nazarbayev believed that this election would contribute much to the “Enlightened Way” program which covers the economy based strategic plan of the country and long term plans to be realized. Thus, the re-election of Nazarbayev strongly guaranteed the political stability for years to come although Central Asia’s biggest economy is currently experiencing an economic recession because of Russia’s economic slump and the dramatic fall in global oil prices. That is why, one of Kazakhstan’s main concerns is to diversify its economy as well as to manage the deteriorating geopolitical disadvantages in order not to affect the investment climate in the country.

In the theoretical perspective of this article, the author has used the concept of Henry Kissinger’s three types of leadership: the bureaucratic-pragmatic type, the ideological type and the charismatic-revolutionary type. Kissinger simulates the ideological type principally with the Soviet leadership. For the charismatic-revolutionary leadership, Kissinger highlights leaders who create values, make sacrifices, define goals, accept state’s survival as the top priority, care experience more than ideology and meet the demands of nation-building. He counts the Third World figures who especially became symbol of national independence, Castro of Cuba and Sukarno of Indonesia. Kissinger discovers appropriate examples for the bureaucratic-pragmatic type of leadership as he argues that American leaders suit this type more than any other groups. He criticizes the American leaders due to their insufficient dynamism and lack of conceptual ability than their ideological and charismatic-revolutionary counterparts.

This essay has sought to find answers to why Nazarbayev is seen as the symbol of political stability and what role his leadership plays on the stability in Kazakhstan. The study asserts that not only Kazakhstan but also the Kazakhs are not ready for post-Nazarbayev era and thus, Nazarbayev continues to represent the hope for the Kazakhs as he points out that as long as he feels the energy burning in him, he will be there. His developments will always be remembered as he is trying to leave a vigorous and solid country for the future generations. Nazarbayev is more interested in constructing a future as he has a future vision. He is rarely motivated by material considerations as he believes in making bigger sacrifices. The state’s survival is top priority for him while he sees the state as the representative of the primary, basis and manifestation of social structure. The last snap election demonstrated that when the economic situation or foreign policy disrupt the traditional, social and political structure, Nazarbayev does not refrain himself from reestablishing the legitimacy of his rule.

On the whole, Nazarbayev’s devotion to the liberation struggle, his esteemed multi-vectoral policy orientation, his endeavor to embrace the state’s survival as the top priority, his effective management of enormous political and economic upheavals since the independence, his successful combination of traditional and modern life and the perceptions about Nazarbayev classify his leadership style as the charismatic-revolutionary leadership in nature. Nazarbayev has been in power since 1991 and has his hand in the development of every part of the country. Thus, this article argued that in the case of Kazakhstan, the charismatic-revolutionary leadership and the reasons of Nazarbayev’s reelection in 2015 represent a discursive mechanism that emphasize President Nazarbayev’s centrality to the unity and stability of the nation.

Bibliography

- Abdurasulov, A. 2015. Kazakhs find uneven playing field in Russia's trading bloc, *BBC NEWS*, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-32403837> (10.01.2017).
- Aitken, J. 2009. *Nazarbayev and the Making of Kazakhstan: From Communism to Capitalism*, Continuum, London.
- Aitken, J. 2012. *Kazakhstan: Surprises and Stereotypes After 20 Years of Independence*, Continuum, London.
- Amangaliyeva, M.2010. *Kazakistan'da Kamu Yönetimi Reformları (1991-2010)*, Basılmamış Doktora Tezi, Ankara Üniversitesi, Ankara.
- Arianfar, A. 2016. An Island of Stability in Central Asia: Kazakhstan's Future is Bright under Nazarbayev's Leadership, *THEASTANATIMES*, <http://astanatimes.com/2016/10/an-island-of-stability-in-central-asia-kazakhstans-future-is-bright-under-nazarbayevs-leadership/> (20.01.2017).
- Cleva, D. G. 1989. *Henry Kissinger and the American Approach to Foreign Policy*, Bucknell University Press, Lewisburg.
- Early Presidential Election.2015. *OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission Final Report*, 29 July 2015, <http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/kazakhstan/174811?download=true> (02.10.2016).
- Isaacs, R. 2010. "Charisma and Nation-Building in Kazakhstan: The Post-Soviet Leadership of Nursultan Nazarbayev", *Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism*, ASEN 2010 Conference Special Issue: Nation & Charisma, Volume 10, Issue 3.
- İsayev, B. 2003. "Kazakistan Cumhuriyeti İdari Yapı Reformlarının Temel Yönleri", *Ekonomist Dergisi*, No: 11.
- Kissenger A. H. 1966. "Domestic Structure and Foreign Policy", *Deadalus*, Vol. 95, No. 2, Spring.
- Kolsto, P. 1999. "The price of stability. Kazakhstani control mechanisms in a bipolar cultural and demographic situation", *The Cummings Center, University of Tel Aviv*, 7-9 November, <http://folk.uio.no/palk/stability.htm> (04.10.2016).
- Nazarbayev, A. N. 2012. *Avrasya Yüreğinde*, SFN Yayıncılık, Ankara.
- Nazarbayev A. N. 2016. Kazakhstan Respublikası Prezidenti (Kazakistan Cumhuriyeti Cumhurbaşkanı), *Akorda*, <http://www.akorda.kz/kz/category/prezident>, (20.02.2016).
- Nazarbayev, A. N. 2014. "Kazakistan'ın 30 Gelişmiş Ülke Arasına Girmesinin Temeli", *Kazakhstan 2050 Mengilik El Strategyası*, <https://strategy2050.kz/news/27005/> (02.11.2016).

Olcott, B. M. 1995. *The Kazakhs*, Second Edition, Hoover Institution Press, Stanford.

Olcott, B. M. 1997. *Kazakhstan: Pushing for Eurasia*, (in) Ian Bremmer and Roy Taras (eds), *New States, New Politics. Building the Post-Soviet Nations*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

Feld, J. W. 1979. *International Relations: A Transnational Approach*, Alfred Publishing Company, Sherman Oaks.

Geldenhuis, D. 1984. *The diplomacy of isolation: South African foreign policy making*. Macmillan South Africa, Johannesburg.

Parliament of the Republic of Kazakhstan (Қазақстан Республикасының Парламенті), *Constitution of the Republic of Kazakhstan*, 2011. [http://www.parlam.kz/en/constitution\(08.07.2016\)](http://www.parlam.kz/en/constitution(08.07.2016)).

Maoz, Z. 1990. *National Choices and International Processes*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

Putz, C. 2015. "Is There a 'Kazakhstan' Without Nazarbayev?", *THE DIPLOMAT*, <http://thediplomat.com/2015/05/is-there-a-kazakhstan-without-nazarbayev/> (11.11.2016).

Rajabova, S. 2015. "Nazarbayev's re-election seen as sign of Kazakhstan's Stability", *AZERNEWS*, <http://www.azernews.az/analysis/79116.html> (19.11.2016).

Roberts R. S. 2016. "The Perils of the Autocratic Developmental State: Leadership and Presidential Succession in Kazakhstan", *Georgetown Journal of Asian Affairs*, Winter.

Rustem, M. 2015. "Kazakhstan Unveils 100 Concrete Steps to Implement Institutional Reforms", *THEASTANATIMES*, <http://astanatimes.com/2015/05/kazakhstan-unveils-100-concrete-steps-to-implement-institutional-reforms/> (05.12.2016).

Schatz, E. 2000. "The Politics of Multiple Identities: Lineage and Ethnicity in Kazakhstan," *Europe Asia Studies*, 52 (3).

Sholk, D. 2015. "Understanding Kazakhstan's Politics", *THE DIPLOMAT*, <http://thediplomat.com/2015/05/understanding-kazakhstan-internal-politics/> (18.12.2016).

Strategy2050. 2014. "The Strategy for Development of the Republic of Kazakhstan," *AKORDA*, http://www.akorda.kz/en/official_documents/strategies_and_programs (18.12.2016).

Togayev, B. 2004. *Kazakistan'daki Yasama ve Yürütme Erki*, (Konya Selçuk Üniversitesi, Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, Uluslararası İlişkiler Anabilim Dalı, Basılmamış Yüksek Lisans Tezi), Konya.

TÜRKPA. 2012. *Türk Cumhuriyetleri Anayasaları*, TÜRKPA Yayınları 4, Ankara.

Wolfel, L. R. 2002. "North to Astana: Nationalistic motives for the movement of the Kazakh(stani) capital", *Nationalities Papers: The Journal of Nationalism and Ethnicity*, 30:3.

Yılmaz, S. 2015. “Kazakistan’da Devlet Başkanlığı Seçimleri: Sonucu Belli Bir Yarış”, *Akademik Perspektif*, <http://akademikperspektif.com/2015/04/21/kazakistanda-devlet-baskanligi-secimleri-sonucu-belli-bir-yaris/> (27.12.2016).

Yılmaz, S. 2016. *Kazakistan’ın Türkiye Politikası*, Basılmamış Doktora Tezi, Trakya Üniversitesi, Edirne.

Yılmaz, S. 2014. “Economy Comes First, Initiating Turkish-Kazakh Relations: Who Undertook the responsibility?”, *International Journal Turkic Studies Review* 1-1. pp. 28-40

When dragons dance with bears, *The Economist*, 30 Nov 2006, <http://www.economist.com/node/8355173> (18.12.2016).