

THE IMPACT OF ESDP ON EU-NATO RELATIONS

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INTRODUCTION

It could be argued that the end of the Cold War had given the EU the opportunity to forge itself as the security agent in Europe even though by the mid-1990s the atmosphere as well as the situation had changed. NATO was remerged and took the initiative to develop the defense policy. As Sjursen (1998: 95) states that the notion of a European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) was not coined at the end of the Cold War, it was come into being with the breakdown of bipolarity in Europe. However, there are a few questions to be illuminated such as how can ESDP be defined? Is it all about creating federal Europe with its own proper and strong military power? or getting attached to the back of NATO or USA to defend the Union for external threats?

In this chapter the effects of the emergence of the ESDP on NATO-EU Relations will be focused by touching upon the influence of the USA and some EU member states on this process. The theory of realism is taken into consideration to understand the main motivation of the emergence of ESDP and the essence of ESDP-NATO relations.

REALIST APPROACH TO THE ESDP

For realists there are certain principles such as the centrality of states, their national interests, their power and their security matter. Realists claim according to Forsberg (2007: 4) that the emergence of the ESDP is based on the view that European defense cooperation is not only motivated by the integration itself, but also by the rivalry with the USA. This rivalry does not mean with the ability of the EU to match the US with military power, but to able to gain more autonomy and independence from the USA. However this does not necessarily mean that the EU fears any military threat from the USA, this rather a quest for a "balance of power" or "balance of influence" as Stromvik (2005 : 49) points out. Although the EU on a quest for what it is mentioned above, the EU is heavily dependent on the US support in terms of security and defense. For realists, power and sufficiency are the key elements in international relations, and in the case of Kosovo crisis it was seen that the EU was not good enough and it indicated the existence of a technology and performance gap between the US and EU as Europeans were bound to concede the air campaign (Forsberg, 2007: 12). That is where Posen (2006: 159) puts forward this opinion that "if Europeans wish to influence the management of global security affairs, they need to be able to show up globally with capabilities, that matters to local outcomes" to support the argument, the emergence of the ESDP could be regarded as an achievement of the balance of power because after the criticism of the Bush administration, many Europeans thought that it might be the right time to take actions as an union but on its own the EU would probably struggle.

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To support this statement some member states in the Union tend not to fully entrust the ESDP, they are therefore susceptible to the notion that NATO could take the initiative for crisis because as it was seen in the case of Sudan, Grevi (2006: 3) puts, where "the Union pays the bill but gets little credit!" that is why the budget of the CFSP needs to be increased to carry out the growing requirements of crises managements.

THE EMERGENCE AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF ESDP

When the time was 1999, Europe and the rest of the globe witnessed the appearance of a new and unprecedented political project called European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) as Howorth (2003: 221) points out that it is a political and strategic project which has not superseded the national security and defense policies of the EU member states. It has a common body of instruments which all member states agree to implement collectively and which has acquired its own distinct profile and footprint. Similarly, Bono (2002: 5) states that "the ESDP is an expression of the desire of the EU to develop military and civilian capabilities to project its power regionally and globally. It is about finding a new 'burden sharing' between NATO and EU". It could be put forward that this project does not intend to create potentially offensive and aggressive armed forces. As Fortmann, Paul, Wirtz argues that it is a sort of soft balancing meaning by that it aims to achieve a degree of autonomy in defense matters and a vehicle to assist further progress (Fortmann: 2004: 360-361). It aims to promote integration and solidarity in the security and defense field. It could be argued that ESDP is aimed to strengthen the EU's capacity for, may be discussed that, the question of whether the EU has an autonomous capacity to plan and command crisis management missions constituted the emergence of ESDP. All the members of the Union have been firmly in favour of the EU-NATO cooperating more effectively. However, as Toje (2008: 7-8) notes that several countries in Europe (France, Germany and England) have national headquarters that are adequate for commanding the EU military missions. They therefore want autonomous for EU operational planning because the duplication of NATO assets is not wanted and, according to Özen, the word 'autonomous' was preferred deliberately as it seems softer than being independent and demonstrates that the EU may intent to act independent from NATO with regard to some issues (Özen: 2002: 238).

The first incursion of the EU into security policy came with the Single European Act (SEA) of 1987 which opened up debates on the political and economic aspect of European Political Cooperation (EPC). However, the more significant change came with the Maastricht Treaty which removed the artificial distinctions of the SEA and allowed the EU to deal with all issues related to security. In this regard the EU's first defense dimension was given to the West European Union (WEU) this was regarded as the 'defense arm' of the EU, but gradually over the years the difficult subjects did not get solved and it was understood that the WEU could not fulfill the roles of both military planning staff and international military staff which had restricted the WEU's ability to function effectively during crises situations. Most analysts and doctrinaires therefore did not believe in any progress within the ESDP as there was so little political will or effective decision-making mechanism in order to deploy even limited military power. This situation for example is expressed by Van Ham (2002: 17) that he was not

optimistic regarding the WEU could make any important contribution so as to prevent Europe from conflicts and crises.

The Western European Union (WEU) did suppose a stronger role in European defense partly because it was in competition with NATO in a number of policy areas. According to Bono (2002: 17), after the collapse of the Soviet Union NATO was regarded as an unnecessary organization by some, in fact its military and political postured increased and this resulted in tensions Between NATO and the WEU relationship. To fuel the fire, the significance of the development of a European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) was conceded by NATO. The situation aimed undertake peacekeeping operations however after purposing the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF), the Clinton administration sought a new way of organizing command and control structure within NATO, but there was not a clear definition of the division of labour that needed to be built between NATO and the WEU. A solution finally came out at the NATO Berlin Summit in June 1996. According to Summit (www.nato.int), the new agreement would "permit the creation of coherent military forces capable of cooperation under the political control and strategic direction of the exclusively European Security organization the Western European Union". Despite the fact that the Summit also announced that headquarters to be identified for allowing the WEU to use NATO assets, but the lack of leadership came out right at that moment because of the discussions over the exact interpretation of the agreement. However, here there is slightly more important point that is the relations of EU-USA; the potential contradiction between the EU and NATO. It is assumed that NATO always wants to become more than a military alliance, if not it becomes a 'transatlantic community' (Robertson: 2003: 7). The unclear definition of Europe's security role and difficulties in determining strong foreign policies have kept the EU going not far beyond specifying its general goals. These all have made the EU dependent on NATO's presence when it comes to security and defense.

What is also important in the emergence of ESDP is the 1998 Franco- British St. Malo initiative which was the key factor to increase Europe's military capacity. This is according to Toje (2008: 11) often referred to as the 'birth certificate' of the ESDP. He further argues that this declaration charted a middle path way between the traditional 'Europeanist' position and the 'Atlanticist' view. This mean is the EU needs to be in a position to play its full role on the world stage while acting in conformity with the respective obligations in NATO. St. Malo Declaration (Rutten: 2001: 8-9) is significant for ESDP because it stated that; "The Union must be given appropriate structures and a capacity for analysis of situations, sources of intelligence, and a capability for relevant strategic planning without unnecessary duplication, taking account of the existing assets of the WEU and the evolution of its relations with the EU. In this regard, the EU will also need to have recourse to suitable military means (European capabilities pre-designated without NATO's European pillar or national or multinational European means outside the NATO)".

It should be emphasized that, with the St.Malo Declaration it is agreed on creating a stronger EU defense policy with the condition of not decreasing the role of NATO. In June 1998, with

the EU Cologne Summit (www.europarl.europa.eu), 'the Petersburg tasks' (Petersburg Declaration, Part II, paragraph 4; Bonn, 19 June 1992) were transferred to the EU. These tasks are;

- humanitarian and rescue tasks;
- conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks;
- tasks of combat forces in crisis management.

On the basis of these tasks, the EU would have EU-led operations without using NATO capabilities. These tasks strengthen the role of EU as a civilian power in world politics. Another important initiative is the 1999 Helsinki European Council where the ESDP came into being and where member states set themselves a defense capability target called the Helsinki Headline Goal (HHG). This called for the EU to be able to deploy a Rapid Reaction

Force of up to 60.000 combat troops at sixty days notice for missions including crisis management, peacekeeping and peace-making operations (see, www.civitas.org.uk). Civilian aspect of crisis management strengthens and new missions are incorporated to ESDP with Feira EU Summit in June 2000 (www.consilium.europa.eu). The member states agreed to provide 5000 police officers for the crisis management.

After 9/11 event, the EU reconsidered its strategic goals and European Security Strategy Paper is signed in 2003 with Brussels Summit. This paper emphasized the importance of conflict prevention and effective multilateralism. It is stated that EU's relations with the NATO, UN and the other regional organizations are essential (EC: 2003: 9-1). The Helsinki Headline Goal 2003 was not successful because EU member states national interest came into

forefront and they did not give the financial support to the Union for the establishment of Rapid Reaction Force. Therefore in 2004 the Headline Goal 2010 is agreed on (www.consilium.europa.eu). 'Battle groups' concept which will be composed of 3-4 EU members, is replaced with the idea of Rapid Reaction Force (Tangör: 2012: 591). In addition, according to Giegerich (2007: 43), a European Defense Agency (EDA) was set up to strengthen the security and defense capabilities of member states and help them to reach their capability targets. The ESDP became Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) with an article of Lisbon Treaty which is came into force in 2009. The Treaty of Lisbon (2007: 36) adds also three new tasks to the Petersburg Tasks. These are;

- joint disarmament operations;
- military advice and assistance tasks;
- tasks in post-conflict stabilization.

The Treaty of Lisbon "acknowledges the potential intervention of multinational forces¹ in the implementation of the CSDP and these forces are the re- 1 The main "Euroforces" are: Eurofor, regrouping land forces between Spain, France, Italy and Portugal; Eurocorps, regrouping land forces between Germany, Belgium, Spain, France and Luxembourg; Euromarfor, regrouping maritime forces Between Spain, France, Italy and Portugal; the European Air Group, regrouping air forces result of the military alliance between certain Member States who have decided to combine their capacities, equipment and personnel strength" (See, http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/institutional_affairs/treaties/lisbon_treaty/ai0026_en.htm).

THE BACKGROUND OF EU-NATO RELATIONS

No matter what happens, it is said that NATO and the EU are in collaboration to prevent and solve problems, crisis and conflicts in Europe and outside of Europe. They are currently in fight with terrorism thus NATO seeks a strong NATO-EU partnership not only on the ground, where both organizations have deployed assets to Kosovo and Afghanistan, but also in their strategic dialogue at the political headquarters level in Brussels. When we look at the historical overview of EU-NATO relations, the years between 1999 and 2002 is significant. In that context, Bono (2002: 32) observes significant points that from the end of 1999 to the spring of 2000, there was in fact an intense transatlantic debate about the scope of relationship between ESDP and NATO. Regarding this debate there were two views, on the one hand, Britain and USA insisted that NATO embarked on a discussions with the EU regarding their military relationship, on the other hand, French officials insisted on opposing the establishment of formal touch between the two organization because they believed that the strength of NATO would push the emerging of ESDP into imitating procedures, policies and structure of the US vision of the world.

At the same time, the US Government had some concerns so called 3 D's which were expressed by Albright. 3 D's is, quoted from Sloan (2000: 16), -no decoupling is the fear that the EU develops its own security and defense policies and thus leaves NATO; -no duplication is again the fear that the EU would imitate NATO procedures and tasks without producing something new; -no discrimination which referred to policies the EU may adopt and these might discrimination non EU-NATO member states and it is obvious that Turkey, which has the second largest army in NATO, is pointed here¹. It is important to avoid unnecessary duplication of efforts, ensure transparency and respect the autonomy of the two organizations. As for ESDP, the two organizations took one step ahead in solidarity with the signing of the NATO-EU Declaration on ESDP in December 2002 and the agreement in March 2003 (Berlin Plus) of the framework for cooperation (www.nato.int). Berlin Plus covers three main elements that are directly connected to operations and which can be combined: EU access to NATO planning, NATO Eurotween Germany, Belgium, Spain, France, Italy, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom.

¹ In order to create an opposite statement, NATO Secretary General in 1999 put forward the negativity of 3D's with more positive 3i's which are; improvement in Europe's military capacity; inclusiveness for all NATO allies and lastly indivisibility of transatlantic security which is one of the key elements in the relations.

So in a nutshell the principles are underscored as partnership effective mutual consultations, dialogue, cooperation, transparency and respect for the interests of the member states of both organizations. So much that, up until the mid-1990s there was almost no contact between the EU and NATO. After the collapse of the Soviet Union the two organizations were very skeptical of expanding NATO's role. According to Cameron (2007: 87), for several years a key obstacle for developing EU-NATO Relations at a working level was the difficulties in achieving security arrangements to support an inter-institutional relationship, which became known as 'Berlin Plus' that made NATO assets available to WEU-led operations in order to foster European defense within NATO. In 2002, the EU and NATO declaration assured access to NATO assets and planning capabilities for the EU-led crisis management operations and Berlin Plus made a

serious of institutional arrangements between NATO and the EU provide them with exchanging information securely and EU has the access to NATO capabilities.

THE EU-NATO RELATIONS AND ESDP

However, despite the fact that the EU and NATO engage in more Regular contacts, there is still some underlying tension concerning roles and command functions. Besides this, these two have failed to determine their objective goals for their members in terms of priorities. For example to what extent can the member states afford to allocate their defense budget in accordance with both EU and NATO requirements? NATO is pretty much aware of the importance of the ESDP so much that, NATO Bucharest Declaration points out that; "We recognize the value that a stronger and more capable European defense brings, providing capabilities to address the common challenges that both NATO and the EU face" (www.nato.int). The first EU-led military operation held in Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) in 2003 and EU operated in accordance with Berlin plus operation with NATO assets. The same year of December, NATO and the EU exercised the first crisis management together and the NATO-EU Capability Group which was newly established "to ensure the coherence and mutual reinforcement of NATO and EU capability development efforts" (Buharali: 201: 3). The successful start of the cooperation between NATO and the EU had some difficulties in the following years.

The influence of the USA over ESDP is one of the big obstacles for NATOEU cooperation. The change of administration in Washington in January 2001, Bush administration was more eager to convert its attention to Asia and Middle East and less sympathetic to support ESDP. However, the terrorist attacks of 9/11 transformed the context both for ESDP and for transatlantic relations that US policies were built around the center of American interests.

Bush Administration thus, in Bono's (2002: 42) words, "resuscitated the NATO and UN's political roles, thus endorsing a revised version of multilateralism as an essential tool for its 'war on terrorism' campaign. The USA has a leadership role in NATO and the USA considers the EU as vehicle to strength European military capabilities. It was thus expressed by the American ambassador to NATO in 2008 that both the EU and NATO and the world need 'a stronger and more capable European capacity'. Although the US generally welcomed the EU's shift towards greater self-reliance but at the same time remained skeptical and fearful of potential EU challenges to US leadership. The same concern is articulated by Toje (2008: 21) that it cannot be shadowed the influence of Washington in this relation. For instance, as it is known that the EU's first military mission was to Congo in 2003 launched without consulting NATO and this irked some people in Washington.

I suppose that is the reason why the EU and NATO ended up launching separate missions to Sudan to help African Union handle Darfur crisis. This influence showed itself during Iraq crisis because before the crisis the EU heads government had already agreed their first common security strategy, 'a secure Europe in a better world' however, says Wallace (2003: 541), during the Iraq War the member states fell out over the US invasion in Iraq and that made them had the most bitter dispute over foreign policy since 1973-74. History often repeats itself and I claim speaking with one voice has not popped into the EU yet. The declaration of Germany, France,

Belgium and Luxembourg, who had led the resistance to the US-led invasion in Iraq, demonstrated that they will create a nucleus capability around Franco- German relations in which they plan and conduct the operations for the EU.

However, the problem is this proposal was omitted by the other European member states because there is still a hesitation about whether the EU should become a counterweight to the military power of the USA or of NATO. This may be the reason why the US is not keen to see ESDP take bigger role, is unhappy with the low level of defense expenditure in EU countries and is not ready to treat the EU as a real partner in this context.

The resource incapability is one of the other obstacles over the operation capacity of ESDP. Former President of NATO Military Committee Klaus Naumann stated that 50 billion Euro is necessary for the establishment of European army and to reach the capacity stated in Helsinki Summit and it is difficult to handle this economic burden for any EU member states (Kasim: 2002: 89). Especially the Eurozone crisis which became effective in 2010 will increase this economic burden. The situation of non-EU member states (Norway, Iceland and Turkey) which are NATO members became an obstacle for the ESDP-NATO relations. Especially Turkey as a NATO member state which is not an EU member state became prominent in this relationship in that context. EU use NATO asset as regarding but excluded Turkey from the ESDP. The USA supported Turkey in this process after Helsinki Summit. In 21 November 2001 the United Kingdom, the USA and Turkey signed Ankara Agreement. This agreement assured Turkey that it would not exclude form the ESDP operations. Greece opposed to Ankara Agreement concerning to the political problems Between Greece and Turkey and created a deadlock. In October 2001, in EU Council meeting in Brussels, a new paragraph added to Ankara Agreement with the Brussels Document. It is stated that; "...under no circumstances, nor in any crisis, will ESDP be used against an Ally, on the understanding, reciprocally that NATO military crisis management will not undertake any action against the EU or its members" (EC: 2002: 24-25).

CONCLUSION

A journey which began to come into being with the bravery of the British Prime Minister Tony Blair who was astonished to discover how limited a force the Europeans were able to mobilize in an emergency, and how dependant they were on US transport and communications. The notion was to make more and concerted effort so as to built military forces that are capable of 'out-of-area' operations. He made a point about the inadequate human needs, equipment and inefficiency of the members states of the EU in terms of not delivering sufficient capabilities for ESDP and this could be regarded as inadequate capabilities of the ESDP. Kosovo war demonstrated this inadequacy and indicated that transatlantic relationship was inevitable because after this was it was understood, by Rusi (2001: 117-118), that Europe was unable to solve any crisis without the help of the USA. Lindstrom (2005: 1) thus states that there is a need for a European strategy that addresses the current gap between internal and external security. The ESDP's instrument therefore should be made available for utility of both within and outside the EU.

The recent reintegration into NATO could be seen conditional on strengthening of the ESDP and that made the relationship between NATO and the EU stronger, however this shows that how far the EU away from speaking with one voice. Various national interests, lack of European identity and the differences among the EU members in terms of ambitions values, interests and so forth, created some doubts about the credibility of the ESDP. If the EU wants to become military power, it needs to increase its defense budget and should not be shy away from spending money on servicing, training and bases and maintenance. The dissolution of Soviet Union at the beginning of 1990s did not only bring new challenges in terms of changing security threats and the enlargement of both the EU and NATO, but also provided opportunities for cooperation among states and security organisations like the EU and NATO. In terms of security and defense of the EU, The Military Committee and Military Staff, together with the Rapid Reaction Force have the potential of strengthening the EU's military muscle in the near future. It is argued that a failure to accomplish synergies in European security and defense capabilities will be regarded as a missed opportunity to facilitate the development of the ESDP in the future. This project has moved and still moving rapidly from infancy to adolescence and eventually maturity. The EU is making some progress towards shared military as well as civilian capabilities. It is indispensably a global giant (with regards to economic power) and should be sharing the accountability for the global security in order to build a better world, and in any case the EU has solid presence in international system by taking into account its capabilities, economic scope, financial assistance, diplomatic and military tools. The EU actually showed some courage by undertaking a few operations such as 2003 Bosnia and Herzegovina and Republic of Congo, however these missions remained very limited in scope and demonstrated a lack of leadership, commitment and interest of the EU member states. The fact is that "the EU has no military capabilities as its own disposal' just like the USA.

This study I assume raised a few questions like whether NATO will continue to be the primary security organization in Europe, or the EU will gradually replace NATO in this regard. The importance of this should not be evaluated in terms of which organisation is more or less effective. However what is significant is that whether or not this would help to enhance avowed norms of peace, stability and prosperity for the EU as

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